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Asperger’s Syndrome and the Eccentricity and Genius of
Jeremy Bentham
PHILIP LUCAS AND ANNE SHEERAN1
Introduction
It is well known that Bentham was eccentric. He was ‘reclusive and inaccessible [...]
had a favourite walking stick named Dapple [...] an ancient cat [...] called the
Reverend Dr John Langborn, and a jokey vocabulary [...] [using] expressions like
“antejentacular circumgyration”, meaning a walk before breakfast’.2 After his death his
body was dissected, in accordance with his will, in front of a group of his friends.
Bentham was also a genius, producing remarkable work of undisputed contemporary
importance. Clearly he had an extraordinary mind.
We asked ourselves whether an explanation for Jeremy Bentham’s unusual
positive and negative qualities might emerge if his life were assessed from a present-day
psychological, psychodynamic or psychiatric perspective. While aware of the
reductionist pitfalls of psychobiography, we believed such an effort might illuminate
aspects of Bentham’s character and motivations and thereby assist future biographers.
Our findings suggested that, had he lived in the present century, it is likely he would
have received the diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome.
Genius, eccentricity and Asperger’s syndrome
We hypothesise that Jeremy Bentham’s strikingly unusual cast of mind can be best
understood as emerging from Asperger’s syndrome (AS) which is an autistic
condition compatible with a wide range of outcomes, from high achievement and
independence to severe impoverishment of quality of life. 3 It manifests as a
characteristic triad of impairments: at the behavioural level in social and
1 The authors are grateful for the late Roy Porter’s suggestion to PL that he study Jeremy Bentham
from the point of view of psychopathology. PL is an associate member of the British Psychoanalytic Society
and Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, North London Forensic Service, Camlet 2, Chase Farm Hospital,
Enfield, EN2 8JL. AS is a Chartered Clinical and Forensic Psychologist, Kent Forensic Psychiatry
Service. Correspondence to Dr Lucas (email: philipalucas@yahoo.co.uk)
2 J. Dinwiddy, Bentham, Oxford & New York, 1989, pp. 17-18.
3 See T. Grandin, Thinking in Pictures and Other Reports from My Life with Autism, New York, 1995; K.
Nazeer, Send in the Idiots: or How We Grew to Understand the World, London, 2006; and D. Tantam,
‘Asperger syndrome in adulthood’, in U. Frith, Autism and Asperger Syndrome, Cambridge, 1991.
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communicative ability; impaired imaginative capacity; and obsessive preoccupation
with circumscribed interests. Diminished imaginative capacity appears particularly in
the sphere of social relationships,4 and ‘the hallmark of autism and related disorders is
deviant social development, which generally seems to be congenital in nature’.5 AS has
been linked to exceptional talents and ‘genius’ by several authors.6
As Snyder has explained, the autistic mind differs from the normal mind in that it
more readily recalls discrete details, rather than maintaining an image of the whole
picture: it ‘sees more of the parts than the whole’.7 Thus the genius who suffers from
AS is thought to lack certain neuropsychological mechanisms related to the ordinary
process of mental modelling. 8 Somehow, in certain cases, that defect allows the
flowering of a unique creative capacity linked to the ability to perceive details, their
structure and interrelation, which remain unrecognised by the ‘normal’ mind. We
contend that just such a distinct and ‘abnormal’ cognitive style may have been an
important source of Bentham’s genius.
It has been suggested that Wittgenstein chose to focus on the two areas (language
and its social context) that as an AS sufferer confounded him, precisely because they
did confound him.9 We believe that Jeremy Bentham’s choice of areas to investigate
may have similar origins.
Diagnosis of autism and Asperger’s syndrome
Autism and Asperger’s syndrome, first described in the 1940s, are ‘pervasive
developmental disorders’ which sufferers are usually born with, but which can take
some time to become evident. The disorders result from abnormal brain development
and, while genetic factors are important, the precise aetiology remains uncertain.10
4 U. Frith, Autism: Explaining the Enigma, (2nd edn.), Oxford, 2003.
5 F. Volkmar & D. Pauls, ‘Autism’, Lancet, lxii (2003), pp. 1133-41.
6 For example, B. Hermelin, Bright Splinters of the Mind: a Personal Story of Research with Autistic
Savants, London, 2001; M. Fitzgerald, Autism and Creativity: Is There a Link between Autism in Men and
Exceptional Ability?, London, 2003; A. Snyder, ‘Autistic Genius?’, Nature, cdlxxxii (2004), pp. 470-
1; and L. Pring, ‘Savant Talent’, Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology, xlvii (2005), pp.
500-3.
7 See Snyder, ‘Autistic Genius?’, pp. 470-1.
8 Wittgenstein and Einstein have been suggested: see O. Sacks, An Anthropologist on Mars: Seven
Paradoxical Tales, London, 1995, and I. James, Asperger’s Syndrome and High Achievement: Some
Very Remarkable People, London, 2005. See also the section on John Howard below.
9 See Fitzgerald, Autism and Creativity.
10 See Frith, Autism; Volkmar and Pauls, ‘Autisim’; and I. Hacking, ‘What is Tom saying to Maureen?’,
London Review of Books, xxviii (11 May 2006), pp. 3-7.
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Exceptionally severe deprivation can result in a perhaps identical picture.11 While much
recent work has stressed a neuro-cognitive perspective focussing on the autistic subjects’
lack of understanding of the existence of minds (‘theory of mind’), it is important to
recognise that in normal development, engagement with people, with the mother as a
person, comes first. ‘For those of us who do not have autism, it is natural to become
engaged with people. We do not have concern or hatred for others because we think
they have a mind. It is the other way round: we come to think people have minds
because we find we are involved with them. What we begin with is our attitudes
towards persons’.12
The disorder is manifest as subtle differences in development compared with
normal individuals: ‘[The] typical infant comes equipped with a partly innate set of
neurological mechanisms for making sense of other people’s actions, emotional
expressions and vocalisations. The two year old who will comfort his mother when
she is looking sad, or who will refrain from hitting his sister because he is aware that
she can feel pain, is already mind- reading (or empathising). The 14-month-old child
who will look where her father is pointing - without being taught - is already mind-
reading her father’s intention to direct her to look not at his finger, but at the event
across the room that has caught her father’s interest. That same 14-month-old who
will then look back at her father’s eyes, to signal she has seen what he has seen, to
acknowledge that the message has been received and the emotional significance
shared, is demonstrating extra-ordinary mind-reading skills — all without words.
Such looks and exchanges of smiles and acknowledgements are reduced or delayed
in many children who go on to receive a diagnosis of autism or Asperger’s
syndrome’.13
An account of the effect on the AS sufferer is provided by an intelligent young
man recalling his childhood:
I really didn’t know there were people until I was seven years old. I then
suddenly realised there were people. But not like you do. I still have to
remind myself that there are people [...] I never could have a friend. I
11 See M. Rutter et al., ‘Quasi-autistic patterns following severe early global privation’, Journal of
Child Psychology and Psychiatry, xl (1999), pp. 537-549.
12 See P. Hobson, The Cradle of Thought, London, 2002, p. 251.
13 See S. Baron-Cohen, ‘Learning to be Ordinary’, Prospect, cxxii (2006), pp. 66-8.
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really don’t know what to do with other people really.14
There is an increasing body of opinion focussing on the centrality of emotions
in normal cognitive development. Thus conditions of severe emotional deprivation may
have an adverse impact on neural connections in parts of the brain and can, in
exceptional circumstances, result in an autistic picture (as mentioned above).15 There
is general understanding that satisfactory emotional development requires a ‘good
enough’ relationship with an attachment figure. Thus, while the majority of
investigations into autism focus on the cognitive abnormality of the individual with
the condition, recent work on emotional development suggests there should be
greater emphasis on the interdependency of individual development and the
‘affective-cognitive and conative processes of interpersonal relatedness’.16
Clinical diagnosis of autism and AS involves evidence of impairment in each of
the domains of social, communicative and imaginative functioning. Although
abnormalities in social development are often evident well before the age of three, that
age is taken as the cut-off by which they should be manifest. The disorder is life-long
and persists into adulthood. In adults in whom the question of the diagnosis is raised,
one seeks corroboration in the early developmental history.17
14 Cited in Hobson, p. 11.
15 Rutter et al. pp. 537-49.
16 See The Many Faces of Asperger’s Syndrome, ed. M. Rhode & T. Klauber, London, 2004, p. 52; and
Hobson, Cradle of Thought, pp. 239-74.
17 The following abnormalities are observed in autistic conditions (listed by domain):
Qualitatively abnormal reciprocal social interaction
1. Failure adequately to use eye-to-eye gaze, facial expression, body posture and gesture to regulate
social interaction. 2. Failure to develop relations with peers that involve a mutual sharing of interests,
activities and emotions. 3. Lack of socio-emotional reciprocity as shown by an impaired or deviant
response to other people’s emotion or lack of modulation of behaviour according to social context
or a weak integration of social, emotional and communicative behaviours. 4. Lack of reciprocal social
interaction, and lack of a spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests or achievement with other
people.
Qualitatively abnormal communication
1. Delay or total lack of spoken language development. 2. Relative failure to initiate or sustain conversation
in which there is reciprocal responsiveness to the communications of the other person. 3. Stereotyped or
idiosyncratic use of word or phrase. 4. Lack of varied, spontaneous make-believe or (in the young) lack
of imitative play.
Restricted, repetitive, stereotyped behaviour and/or interests
1. An encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and restricted patterns of interest that
are abnormal in content or focus; or one or more interests that are abnormal in their intensity and
circumscribed nature though not in their content and focus. 2. Compulsive routines or rituals. 3.
Stereotyped motor mannerisms. 4. Preoccupation with parts of objects, non-functional elements of
play materials e.g. odour, surface feel or vibration. See: World Health Organization, Pocket Guide to
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Bentham’s childhood
The evidence suggests that Jeremy Bentham was a ‘frail, nervous, impressionable
boy, a prey to nightmares and afraid of ghosts, he found his main sources of enjoyment
in whatever books he could lay his hands on and in flowers and music’.18 As Bentham
wrote much later, `This subject of ghosts has been among the torments of my life, the
devil was everywhere in it and in me too [...] how much less unhappy I should have been,
could I have acknowledged my superstitious fears!’19 Bentham’s mother died when he
was ten years old; his father was ‘affectionate towards him, but demanding and
insensitive’.20 In the nine years which separated Jeremy from his younger brother
Samuel, five other children had been born and had died in infancy or early childhood.
Only Jeremy and Samuel survived. These family circumstances may have contributed to
the remarkably close bond between the two brothers.21
In Bentham’s case, there was no general delay in language or cognitive
development, quite the reverse in fact. A delay in language development is the basis of
the distinction, made by some authorities, between AS and high functioning autism.
In terms of signs of AS, there are aspects of his childhood that are compatible
with the diagnosis but nothing more definite. He `had few companions his own age’; he
was ‘morbidly sensitive’; ‘when robbed of all his money at Oxford he did not confide
in his father. He was paying by a morbid reserve for the attempts made to force him
into premature activity’ and ‘[t]he lad’s diffidence and extreme youth had indeed
prevented him from forming the usual connections which his father anticipated as the
result of a college life’.22
Bentham’s father was highly ambitious for his child prodigy of a son, and
intended him to reach the summit of the legal profession. Bentham studied law but
did not become a practising lawyer: he found the practice of law intolerable and rapidly
the ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders, London & New York, 1994. In this
international consensus classification of autistic disorders, a diagnosis of AS would require the same
abnormalities of reciprocal social interaction as autism but ‘no significant general delay in spoken or
receptive language or cognitive development [...] Isolated special skills, often related to abnormal
preoccupations, are common, but are not required for diagnosis’, p. 286.
18 Dinwiddy, Bentham, p. 1.
19 The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. J. Bowring, 11 vols., Edinburgh, 1843, x. pp. 11-21.
20 Dinwiddy, Bentham, p. 1.
21 See C. Pease-Watkin, ‘Jeremy and Samuel Bentham — the Private and the Public’, Journal of Bentham
Studies, 5, 2002. http://www.ucl.ac.uk/BenthamProject/journal/cpwsam.htm
22 L. Stephen, The English Unitarians, 3 vols. London, 1900, i.
http://socserv2.socsci.mcmasterce/07Eecon/ugcm/3113/bentham/stephen1.htm
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developed a consuming interest in legal philosophy and the theory of legislation.23
William Hazlitt and John Stuart Mill on Bentham: two contemporary
accounts
William Hazlitt and John Stuart Mill, both eminent nineteenth-century thinkers, each
wrote an essay on Jeremy Bentham. The portraits of Bentham that emerge are
remarkably consistent with one another and, in our view, both suggest that Bentham
suffered from Asperger’s syndrome.
Bentham was the first subject in Hazlitt’s collection of sketches of major public
figures of the time, which first appeared as an article in the New Monthly Magazine in
1824, and was published as The Spirit of the Age.24 Mill’s essay on Bentham was first
published in August 1838 (and his essay on Coleridge in March 1840) in the London and
Westminster Review.25 William Hazlitt knew Bentham personally, briefly being his
tenant in York Street, London in 1819 until ‘he fell behind with the rent’.26
John Stuart Mill knew Bentham well, albeit not until Bentham’s sixth decade.
His father, James, had a close professional relationship with Bentham, who had great
influence on the manner in which James educated his son. The latter later gained
exceptional knowledge of Bentham’s work when he worked for Bentham and edited
several volumes of his writing.
Although his essay was written at a time of Mill’s life when his antipathy to
Bentham was at its height, Mill did not renounce the views he expressed although he
‘would later have been less cutting’.27 Both essays will be discussed in some detail before
we go on to present separately evidence for AS in Bentham in terms of each of the triad
of impairments of autism.
To those familiar, from a clinical point of view, with autism and Asperger’s
syndrome it is difficult to read either Hazlitt’s or Mill’s essay without the thought that
Bentham might suffer from AS. Clinical diagnosis of AS is made in just that way: a
familiar, rather subtle, pattern is recognised and only then are more explicit questions
23 It is perhaps not purely by chance that Kamran Nazeer, an Asperger’s syndrome sufferer who qualified
in law, found himself following a similar course to Bentham’s from law to the philosophy of law: see
Nazeer, Send in the Idiots, p. 110.
24 W. Hazlitt, The Spirit of the Age, ed. E.D. Mackerness, Plymouth, 1991, pp. 19-35.
25 See Utilitarianism and Other Essays: John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, ed. A. Ryan, London, 1987,
pp. 132-175.
26 T. Paulin, The Day-Star of Liberty: William Hazlitt’s Radical Style, London, 1998, p. 17.
27 J. Skorupski, Why Read Mill Today?, London & New York, 2006, p. 67.
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posed and confirmation sought. In Bentham’s case, the established observation that
about 10 percent of autistic individuals have special talents raises the possibility that
AS can explain his genius.
Hazlitt describes Bentham’s social oddness while giving a view of his world:
in general habits and in all but his professional pursuits, he is a mere child. He
has lived for the last forty years in a house in Westminster, overlooking the Park,
like an anchoret in his cell, reducing law to a system, and the mind of man to a
machine. He scarcely ever goes out, and sees very little company. The favoured
few, who have the privilege of the entrée, are always admitted one by one. He
does not like to have witnesses to his conversation. He talks a great deal, and
listens to nothing but facts.28
Mill described Bentham’s striking lack of ordinary understanding of other people.
He wrote of:
the incompleteness of his [Bentham’s] own mind as a representative of
universal human nature. In many of the most natural and strongest feelings of
human nature he had no sympathy; from many of its graver experiences he was
altogether cut off; and the faculty by which one mind understands a mind
different from itself, and throws itself into the feelings of that other mind, was
denied him by his deficiency of Imagination.29
Mill is describing Bentham’s lack of ‘the intuitive and automatic attribution of
mental states to others’, the ability to `mentalize’ or hold a ‘theory of mind’ of others
and the self, which is defective to some degree in every individual diagnosed as
autistic, regardless of age and ability, and, on the contrary, effortlessly present in the
rest of us.30 Similarly:
With Imagination in the popular sense, command of imagery and
metaphorical expression, Bentham was, to a certain degree, endowed [...]
28 Hazlitt, Spirit of the Age, p. 20.
29 Ryan, Utilitarianism, p. 148, italics added.
30 See Frith, Autism, p. 206.
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[but the] Imagination which he had not, was [...] that which enables us,
by a voluntary effort, to conceive the absent as if it were present, the
imaginary as if it were real, and to clothe it in the feelings which, if it
were indeed real, it would bring along with it. This is the power by
which one human being enters into the mind and circumstances of
another. [...]Without it, nobody knows even his own nature, further than
circumstances have actually tried it and called it out; nor the nature of
his fellow creatures, beyond such generalizations as he may have been
enabled to make from his observation of their outward conduct.31
Mill thought, as we no longer do, that a ‘voluntary effort’ was required for such
understanding. It is significant that he links the lack of empathic understanding of
another person with knowing one’s own nature as ‘mentalizing in the normal case
inexorably leads to awareness of yourself as agent’.32 Similarly, ‘Self-consciousness
[...] to which this age knows so much both of its cheerful and its mournful wisdom,
never was awakened in him. How much of human nature slumbered in him he knew
not, neither can we know. He had never been made alive to the unseen influences
which were acting on himself, nor consequently on his fellow creatures’.33
Hazlitt wrote:
He regards the people about him no more than the flies of a summer [...]
he has carried this single view of his subject too far, and not made
sufficient allowance for the varieties of human nature, and the caprices
and irregularities of the human will [...] it might be plausibly objected that
he had struck the whole mass of fancy, prejudice, passion, sense, whim,
with his petrific, leaden mace, that he had "bound volatile Hermes," and
reduced the theory and practice of human life to a caput mortuum of reason,
and dull, plodding, technical calculation’. The limitations of his
understanding of other people is summed up by Hazlitt: ‘his view of the
human mind resembles a map, rather than a picture: the outline, the
31 See Ryan, Utilitarianism, pp. 148-9, italics added.
32 See Frith, Autism, p. 208.
33 See Ryan, Utilitarianism, p. 149. Emphasis added.
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disposition is correct, but it wants colouring and relief.34
This portrayal of a missing third dimension in Bentham’s understanding of others by
an acute contemporary seems highly compatible with that of a sufferer from AS.
Mill also finds Bentham’s philosophy inadequate as a complete explanation of
‘human affairs’:
a sort of estimate of what a philosophy like Bentham’s can do. It can
teach the means of organizing and regulating the merely business part
of the social arrangements [...] He committed the mistake of supposing
that the business part of human affairs was the whole of them.35
Mistaking the business part for the totality of human affairs might almost be a
definition of what is at the heart of the problematic social understanding of the AS
patient. AS sufferers do seem to lack a profound understanding of emotional states,
both their own and those of others. Mill thought this very much applied to Bentham
and limited his ability to understand the ‘workings of the mind’:
Knowing so little of human feelings, he knew still less of the influences
by which those feelings are formed: all the more subtle workings both of
the mind upon itself, and of external things upon the mind, escaped him.36
Mill appreciated Bentham’s achievements: ‘He found the philosophy of law a
chaos, he left it a science: he found the practice of law an Augean stable, he turned
the river into it which is mining and sweeping away mound after mound of its
rubbish’.37 To achieve this required Bentham’s quite extraordinary qualities:
The honour is all his — nothing but his peculiar qualities could have
done it. There were wanted his indefatigable perseverance, his firm self-
reliance, needing no support from other men’s opinion; his intensely
practical turn of mind, his synthetical habits- about all, his peculiar
34 Hazlitt, Spirit of the Age, pp. 21-24, 33.
35 See Ryan, Utilitarianism, p. 157.
36 Ibid., p. 150.
37 Ibid., p. 158.
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method.38
Indefatigable perseverance, firm self reliance, massive egocentricity — all
qualities prominent in descriptions of an AS sufferer obsessively and persistently
following his solitary road in pursuit of his narrow preoccupation. The apparent lack
of interest in other men’s opinions noted by Mill reflects the ‘pure egocentrism’ of
the autistic ‘self that is not ultimately aware of itself and the selves of others’.39
Contrasting Coleridge with Bentham, Mill writes:
And as Bentham’s short and easy method of referring all to the selfish
interests of aristocracies, or priests, or lawyers, or some other species
of impostors, could not satisfy a man who saw so much farther into the
complexities of the human intellect and feelings — [Coleridge]
considered the long or extensive prevalence of any opinion as a
presumption that it was not altogether a fallacy.40
Such holding on to early simplistic explanations for troubling situations is
frequent in AS sufferers. In Bentham’s case he held on to a life long grievance
against those who effected his signing of the Thirty-nine Articles to take his place in
Queen’s College, Oxford: ‘He had to sign the Thirty-nine Articles in spite of scruples
suppressed by authority. The impression made upon him by this childish compliance
never left him to the end of his life’.41
Thus based on Mill’s and Hazlitt’s observations alone, a picture of Bentham is
built up which is highly compatible with that of a sufferer from AS. There is a
particularly clear description of his lack of intuitive understanding of the minds of
others and himself, as well as his egocentrism and his obsessive persistence in
pursuit of his narrow goals.
Problems with social interaction: other contemporary accounts
People with autism and AS are often ‘socially active’ but unable to be ‘socially
interactive’, the distinction relating to the presence or absence of the ability to
38 Ibid., p. 162, italics added.
39 See Frith, Autism, p. 209.
40 See Ryan, Utilitarianism, p. 178.
41 See Stephen, English Unitarians, vol. I.
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mentalize. An example would be the difference between forming an obsessive
attachment (socially active) and forming a reciprocal friendship or relationship
(socially interactive), where an extra dimension is required. A further example
would be ‘showing a desire to please’ (socially active) compared with ‘choosing
appropriate gifts’ (socially interactive) or using a person as a tool as opposed to using
a person as a recipient of information. 42 The following examples suggest Jeremy
Bentham may have been socially active but could often have difficulties being
socially interactive.
Bentham seems to have ‘look[ed] upon friends and even more casual associates
as “disciples” to his own life’s mission [...] [and with] James Mill, George Grote, John
Mill and above all Etienne Dumont [...] he proved unable to sustain close or prolonged
personal friendship’.43
George Bentham
George Bentham was Jeremy Bentham’s nephew, the son of his brother
Samuel and eventually a celebrated botanist. He visited London with his sisters in
1823 and saw his uncle at his home in Queens Square Place. Only George was invited.
He described the occasion in his autobiography:
After dinner he [...] kept me till 11, to talk to me about my sisters, about
his own occupations, and many other things. I do not know how he will be
persuaded to see my sisters, which he now says he is determined not to
do. He says that either he will like them or he will not. If for argument
sake he should not, then there would be only harm done by their meeting.
If he should like them, and should see them once or twice, there would
come the pain of parting, but this would be, I should think, just as good
a reason for not seeing me or anyone else.44
This passage could be seen as evidence of an absence of ‘social-emotional
reciprocity’ characteristic of AS. Other people are considered merely in terms of their
42 See C. Frith & U. Frith, The Physiological Basis of Theory of Mind: Functional Neuroimaging
Studies’, in Understanding Other Minds, ed. S. Baron-Cohen et al., (2nd edn.) Oxford, 2000, p. 337.
43 D. Lieberman, ‘Historiographical Review: from Bentham to Benthamism’, The Historical Journal,
xxviii (1985), pp. 199-224, 201.
44 G. Bentham, Autobiography 1800-1834, ed. M. Filipiuk, Toronto, 1997, p. 104.
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effect or usefulness on the AS sufferer. Pease-Watkin suggests a reason for
Bentham’s interest in George: ‘the only one of Samuel’s children with whom Jeremy
had much of a relationship [...] probably because Jeremy saw the opportunity to make
use of his young nephew as an amanuensis or editor’.45 The highly anxiety-provoking
unpredictability of social situations to an AS sufferer may help explain a practice of
Bentham’s on which Hazlitt also commented: ‘he never has me to meet any of these
people: he does not like more than one guest at once, for he likes to have each guest
[...] all to himself’.46
Edinburgh Review, 1843
In 1843, the Edinburgh Review published a review of Bowring’s ‘Memoirs of Jeremy
Bentham including Autobiographical Conversations and Correspondence’ by William
Empson. It is of course impossible to be certain about the accuracy of the descriptions
of Bentham but much rather unflattering detail about Bentham would be explicable if
understood as describing a sufferer from AS. It is worth considering at some length.
The author of the review comments:
The portrait of a vain man must be ridiculous in its attitudes and smiles;
and Bentham’s vanity was so excessive as to stop short, but by a very
little, of that which sometimes leads to, and almost always indicates, a
disordered mind.47
Bentham’s problem with ordinary friendship was obvious and puzzling: ‘It was
impossible to have a more devoted friend, admirer or ally [than Dumont]. How could
such a friendship fall away? The only explanation Dr Bowring offers of Bentham’s
alienation is a story about some slight which he conceived Dumont to have put upon his
dinners, by contrasting them with the dinners at Lansdowne House!’48 And:
had he but enjoyed the blessing of a wiser father, and a more judicious
bringing up [...] we should not have seen almost all intercourse with
45 See Pease-Watkin, ‘Jeremy and Samuel Bentham’.
46 Cited in J.H. Burns, ‘Dreams and Destinations: Jeremy Bentham in 1828’, The Bentham Newsletter, May
1978, No. 1, p. 26.
47 W. Empson, ‘Memoirs of Jeremy Bentham’, Edinburgh Review, lxxviii (1843), p. 461. Emphasis added.
48 Ibid., p. 466.
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such friends as Trail, Wilson, Romilly, Dumont, Mill etc, gradually
dropped, one after the other, not only with more than philosophic facility,
but in almost every instance with a sneer.49
And again:
[James Mill] describes himself as his most faithful disciple and most
likely successor — and protests that he can see no ground for the
umbrage taken, except their long and uninterrupted intimacy, or the fact
of his having ridden out a few times in the morning with Mr Joseph
Hume, to see a little of the country. This is, no doubt, a poor cause for a
quarrel. But what is worse is, to have lived with a man for years, and yet
speak of him as Bentham speaks of Mill, on more than one occasion, in
the present memoir.50
Bentham’s lack of understanding of the conventions of the social world he
inhabited is well illustrated in the following passage:
they [the ladies of the Shelburne family] were as desirous, one and all,
to cooperate in making Bowood agreeable to their guest [Bentham].
Every thing went on for a while delightfully; until at last they discovered,
when it was too late, that among them, they had overdone their kindness.
[Bentham] mistook the nature of the encouragement he was receiving. In
an evil hour for all parties, love first, and afterwards ambition sprang up,
and got the better of philosophy and friendship [...] This disappointment
must have aggravated the native peculiarities of his character.51
A few further quotes must suffice to exemplify the reviewer’s view of Bentham’s
oddness. ‘Bentham said of himself "I am so much an animal mei generis, that people
must bear from me what they would not from others’.52 And:
49 Ibid., p. 467.
50 Ibid., p. 467.
51 Ibid., p. 483.
52 Ibid., p. 468.
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In this as in many other instances, an ignorance of human nature was at
the bottom of Bentham’s overconfidence. Dr Bowring says that his
bashfulness clung to him through his life like a cold garment; “and that
there was never a man so desirous of shunning others, unless some
strong sense of duty subdued his natural tendency to seclusion”.53
Finally, ‘[w]e are struck with Bentham’s graphic turn of mind, and his constant
attempts to realize his conceptions in some positive and familiar form. Provided only
the image were distinct and effective, he was never deterred by the fear of ridicule.
Indeed, the sense of the ridiculous appears to have been wanting in him’.54 To modern
ears, this eccentricity, this desire ‘of shunning others’, this lack of ‘a sense of the
ridiculous’ and indeed even the ‘graphic turn of mind’ are all consistent with the
possibility of Asperger’s syndrome.
Lord Lansdowne
Of all the episodes of problematic social interaction suggesting lack of ‘theory of
mind’, one of the best-documented involved Lord Lansdowne. As Harrison puts it,
‘The decade [1790s] started with an extraordinary exchange of letters with
Lansdowne in which Bentham accuses his friend, with whom he had just been in
close co-operation producing pamphlets for France, of not being a true patron by
failing to get him into parliament. The apparently disinterested philosopher turned and bit
the hand he thought had failed to feed him. Lansdowne replied in a dignified, friendly,
but justifiably puzzled way’.55
Bentham’s ‘apology’ for his attack on Lansdowne gives some sense of him in a
social context:
My dear, dear Lord, Since you will neither be subdued nor terrified, will
you be embraced? [...] So parliament may go to the devil, and I will take
your Birmingham halfpence and make a low bow, and put them gravely
into my pocket, though they are worse than I threw away before [...] Offer?
- why no, to be sure it was not - why didn’t I tell you I only called it so
53 Ibid., p. 509.
54 Ibid., p. 514, italics added.
55 R. Harrison, Bentham, London & Boston, 1983, p. 20.
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for shortness? More shame for you that you never made me any [...]
Now, could I, after having been counsel for J.B., and made nothing of it,
be counsel for Lord L., and show how much blacker than one’s hat was
the behaviour of the wretch you had to deal with? and then, in the
character of my Lord Judge, — how easy it was to the parties to see the
matter in the different lights, and yet be both of them good sort of men in
their way; but this would take sixty-one pages more, and sixty-one to that,
and you seem to think the first sixty-one enough, and I am sure I do [...] it
would be serving you right, if I were to tell you that that I was not half
so angry as I appeared to be; [...] that the real object of what anger I
really felt, was rather the situation in which I found myself than you or
anybody; but that, as none but a madman would go to quarrel with a non-
entity called a situation, it was necessary for me to look out for somebody
who, somehow or other, was connected with it.56
However, within four months Bentham is writing to his brother:
I quarrelled with Lord L. for not having brought me in. He made
apologies: promised to spare no pains to effect it another time, but would
not give me a promise to turn out for that purpose any of his present
crew, who, he has agreed with me, over and over again, are poor
creatures; so I laughed at him, called his promises Birmingham
halfpence, and so we made it up again — he styling me all this while to
everybody in conversation and on paper, the first of men, diverting
himself not the less with my singularities, as you may well suppose.57
After such a version of this transaction, it will be admitted that Bentham was not safely
to be left alone to tell a story, in which his personal feelings were concerned. It is as
impossible for Bentham to have understood Lord Shelburne to have been apologizing
to him in his answer, as that Lord Shelburne could have conceived that Bentham was
laughing at him in his reply.58 Was Bentham lying, deceiving himself, or did he just not
56 The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham, vol. iv, ed. A. T. Milne, London, 1981 (CW), pp. 183-4.
57 Ibid., p. 208-09. Emphasis added.
58 Empson, ‘Memoirs’, p. 487.
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quite understand what was going on? At the least, there is much that is rather difficult
to explain about Bentham’s behaviour which has much in common with that of
someone with AS.
Egocentricity
Mill commented on Bentham’s ‘firm self-reliance, needing no support from other
men’s opinion’ and, as cited above, Hazlitt suggested he ‘regards the people about him
no more than the flies of a summer’.59
One example relating to the Panopticon project is sufficient to indicate his
tendency to justify his proposals in terms of his feeling that they would be
personally acceptable to him: he shows little capacity here to put himself in the
position of others. In the Panopticon Bill of 1794 he proposed that each prisoner
‘would be tattooed with his name and date and place of birth on the upper part of his
left arm’. He reacted with ‘bewilderment [that] the idea seems to have been met with
ridicule’ and wrote, in 1804, that ‘I intended to have set the example in my own person,
and, if possible, in those of my subordinates:60
Semple concludes her balanced and sympathetic account of the Panopticon
project thus: ‘Bentham does display a certain frightening arrogance. He wrote of
himself:
J.B. the most ambitious of the ambitious. His empire - the empire he
aspires to - extending to, and comprehending, the whole human race, in
all places[...] at all future time"[...] [Bentham] lacked an imaginative
tolerance for the shortcomings of others; he was over-optimistic, he was
ruthless, and he was pre-eminently egocentric.61
We believe this state of arrogant omnipotence might well have arisen as a
consequence of his inability to relate to others as persons like himself, in other words a
result of Asperger’s syndrome.
Another aspect of his perhaps autistic self reliance was his propensity to isolate
himself and work intensively, alone. As Harrison puts it:
59 Ryan, Utilitarianism, p. 162.
60 J. Semple, Bentham’s Prison: a Study of the Panopticon Penitentiary, Oxford, 1993, pp. 181-82.
61 Ibid., pp. 301, 322.
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On many occasions in his later life he referred to himself as a hermit, and
when he could he buried himself in “colleges, chambers, and cottages”.
Even when he visited his brother in a fairly remote part of Russia, he
went off to live in an even more remote cottage where, secure from all
interruption, he could work “double tides” from sunrise until eight each
evening. On return to England, both before and after he inherited his
father’s large, central, house, he buried himself for long periods in a room
in a dilapidated farm at Hendon, eight miles from London.62
‘Normal’ social understanding: the case against autism in Bentham
There is agreement that Jeremy Bentham’s relationship with his brother Samuel was the
most sustained and, probably, the most important to him of his life. In the following
letter, written to his father at the age of twelve when Samuel was almost four, Jeremy
Bentham imagines his brother’s responses to his absence and to his return:
I imagine myself too just returned, finding you and my Grandmama and
dear little Sammy sitting by the fireside when I come in, and his little
Heart exulting and crying Brother Jery is come.— I suppose he often
asks you where I am, and what I stay away for? and suppose I should
come home, what harm will it do? or what then?63
As Semple writes, ‘for Jeremy, love of Samuel was probably the strongest emotion in
his life. He wished to protect, guide, and provide for his young brother’.64 While it is
clear from the quotation above that the twelve year old Jeremy imagines his younger
brother missing him in his absence and being glad when he returns, we do not know
whether this bears any relation to what his brother is actually thinking and feeling.
We know that Jeremy was strongly attached to Samuel. Autistic children have been
shown to react in the same way as non- autistic children to the absence of and reunion
62 Harrison, Bentham, p. 15.
63 16 December 1760. Correspondence (CW), i. ed. T.L.S. Sprigge, London, 1968, p. 31.
64 Semple, Bentham’s Prison, p. 105.
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with their mothers.65 As Frith puts it ‘an awareness of mental states is not required for
attachment behaviour’.66 There are clearly cases where Bentham tries to put himself
into other people’s shoes, at least in a theoretical context. Semple cites Bentham
reflecting on the reaction of ‘a sentimental gentleman’ to the fact that in the
Panopticon, men were to be stripped of all privacy (she comments that ‘the identity
of this gentleman of sensibility has yet to be determined’):
[t]o a temper formed to humanity [who] happens to have added the
elevated birth, the refinements of education and an enthusiastic love of
liberty, inflamed by the circumstances of the time; a never-closing
inquisitorial eye figured itself to him as a new invented instrument, the
only one yet wanting to be added to the horrors of the Bastille. Not to
have a moment exempt from scrutiny of an inquisitorial eye! Not to
have a moment of liberty even of that scanty and melancholy remnant
of liberty which till now has been respected even in a prison! This
punishment is a punishment worse than death: a punishment too horrible,
too intolerable even for the worst of criminals.
His own belief was that if he, Bentham, had nothing to hide, such constant inspection
would be ‘a matter of indifference’ to him or ‘even of comfort’ if he feared abuse of
power by his gaoler.67
There are many, many other examples of Bentham recording what he takes to
be the responses of others and responding in his turn. His correspondence with Lord
Lansdowne cited above is a good example. Perhaps this constitutes an argument
against our AS hypothesis. Similarly, it could be argued that it is difficult to imagine
Bentham’s painstakingly detailed analysis and classification of human motivation in An
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) and A Table of the
Springs of Action (1815) originating in the mind of a man incapable of empathic
understanding. But as will be explained below, it has been well established that the
ability to infer the content of someone else’s mind may be acquired, rather as a
foreign language is learnt, by individuals with AS who have sufficient cognitive and
65 See C. Dissanayake & S.A. Crossley, ‘Proximity and sociable behaviour in autism: evidence in autism’,
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, xxxvii (1996), pp. 149-156.
66 Frith, Autism, p. 109.
67 Semple, Bentham’s Prison, pp. 144, 145.
UCL Bentham Project
Journal of Bentham Studies, vol. 8 (2006)
19
language capability.68 Furthermore, Bentham’s achievements in the works mentioned
can be seen as those of an exceptional ‘systemiser’ rather than those of an
‘empathiser’.69
Communication difficulties
Bentham’s communicative dysfunction is exemplified by his prose style. Marx
described him as ‘the insipid, pedantic, leather-tongued oracle of the commonplace
bourgeois intelligence of the nineteenth century, a genius in the way of bourgeois
stupidity’.70 Hazlitt’s remark is well-known:
his style is unpopular, not to say unintelligible. He writes a language of
his own that darkens knowledge. His works have been translated into
French — they ought to have been translated into English’.
Hazlitt summarises thus:
he writes a cypher-hand, which the vulgar have no key to. The
construction of his sentences is a curious frame-work with pegs and
hooks to hang his thoughts upon, for his own use and guidance, but
almost out of the reach of everybody else. It is a barbarous philosophical
jargon, with all the repetitions, parentheses, formalities, uncouth
nomenclature and verbiage of law-Latin [...] Mr Bentham writes as if he
was allowed but a single sentence to express his whole view of a subject
in, and as if, should he omit a single circumstance or step of the argument,
it would be lost to the world for ever, like an estate by a flaw in the title-
deeds. This is over-rating the importance of our own discoveries and
mistaking the nature and object of language altogether [...] The best of it
is, he thinks his present mode of expressing himself perfect, and that
whatever may be objected to his law or logic, no one can find the least
fault with the purity, simplicity and perspicuity of his style.71
68 See Baron-Cohen, ‘Theory of mind and autism: a fifteen year review’ in Understanding Other
Minds, ed. S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg & D. Cohen, (2nd edn.), Oxford, 2000 p. 15.
69 See the section on ‘Empathising-Systemising Theory’, below.
70 In Das Kapital, cited in Dinwiddy, Bentham, p. 115.
71 Hazlitt, Spirit of the Age, pp. 33-4.
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A Times leading article of 28 November 1829 discusses Bentham’s writing style.
It starts by noting contemporary criticisms of Edward Gibbon’s style but goes on to
say:
if this might be said of EDWARD GIBBON, what shall anyone say of
the much inferior, but infinitely more perplexed and un-Anglican writer
JEREMY BENTHAM? Neither man, nor hog, nor dog, ever produced
such sounds or expressions, or things so far removed from nature, as are
poor JEREMY’S writings.
And in the review of Bowring’s ‘Memoirs of Jeremy Bentham’ (see p.9 above)
the reviewer comments on Bentham’s language: ‘words all but incapable of being
pronounced. The strange language which he invented, was the result of considerable
pains as well as deliberation. When he had once adopted it, laughing at it only made him
the more obstinate in placing it among his most valuable inventions’.72
Bentham’s inability readily to communicate the results of work despite intense
efforts is well- known. In part it was a result of constantly revisiting problems and a lack
of a sense that his contribution was complete. As Harrison put it:
This sense of parts, fragments, uncompleted projects, which is already
present in the early Bentham, forms a constant theme throughout his life.
However much analysis and thought had been given to a particular area,
there was always more that was possible; and Bentham always wished to
fill up all the gaps and explore all relevant by-ways.73
Snyder’s observation that the ‘autistic mind seems to be suited to working
algorithmically within a closed system of specified rules’ would seem an apt
description of Bentham’s working methods. Our hypothesis that Bentham’s was ‘an
autistic mind’ would make sense of his rather obsessional urge to ‘fill up all the gaps
and explore all relevant by-ways’ within the closed system.74
72 Empson, ‘Memoirs’ p. 510.
73 Harrison, Bentham, p. 16.
74 Ibid., p.16.
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Semple writes aptly about objections to Bentham’s proposals for the
Panopticon and the National Charity Company:
In many ways Bentham himself is to blame for these profound
misunderstandings. By a strange irony, he who was so acutely aware of the
delusive power of language, used words in such a way as to create an
impression of ossified, frigid, rule-bound bureaucracy.75
Circumscribed interests
In a sense, a description of the whole of Bentham’s output would provide a complete
list of examples of his ‘obsessive preoccupations with circumscribed interests’ such as
would be required for a diagnosis of autism or AS. As an example of obsessive
preoccupation with a circumscribed interest, the Panopticon cannot be bettered. For
more than two decades, and using much of his personal fortune, Bentham strove to
make real his dream of a penitentiary which he believed would be ‘a way of obtaining
power, power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example’.76 It was ‘an
attempt to reinforce this structuring of human relationships through architecture’, and
‘an opportunity for the practice of omniscience and omnipotence, for as gaoler he
would be the Deity in a microcosm of his own making’.77 But ‘there were probably
few men in England less capable of managing a thousand convicts, in spite of his
theories about “springs of action”‘. 78 Because his attachment to the idea of the
Panopticon has been found scarcely comprehensible,
Bentham’s anguish has met with little sympathy, yet it was real enough.
In the nadir of the panopticon’s fortunes, he felt he would die “like a rat
in a hole” and he clung to memories of childhood in his lonely misery; a
friend, “gave me once a loaf, which reminded me of my boyhood, and I
kept it till it grew green, during Panopticon distress”.79
75 Semple, Bentham’s Prison, p. 316.
76 Panopticon: or the Inspection House, London, 1791, Letter I, cited in R. Evans, The Fabrication of
Virtue: English prison architecture 1750-1840, Cambridge, 1982, p. 199.
77 Evans, Fabrication of Virtue, pp. 207, 199.
78 See Stephen, English Unitarians, Vol. I.
79 Semple, Bentham’s Prison, p. 16, quoting Bentham.
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As Evans puts it, ‘the question of why such a project should take up so much of a
great philosopher’s time has perplexed many of his biographers’.80 We suggest that AS
may provide the answer to that question. According to Semple, Bentham ‘lacked an
imaginative tolerance for the shortcomings of others: he was over-optimistic, he was
ruthless, and he was pre-eminently egocentric. The panopticon mirrors these faults’.81
Bentham’s psychological theory: individualistic behaviourism
Does the hypothesis that Bentham suffered from AS shed light on Bentham’s theory of
human nature and motivation, his psychological theory?
As mentioned above, both Hazlitt and J.S. Mill judged Bentham’s view of
human nature impoverished and inadequate. Hazlitt’s view was that Bentham has ‘not
made sufficient allowance for the varieties of human nature, and the caprices and
irregularities of the human will’ Mill’s that he
saw [...] in man little but what the vulgarest eye can see; recognized no
diversities of character but such as he who runs may read [...] and no one,
probably, who [...] ever attempted to give a rule to all human conduct, set
out with a more limited conception either of the agencies by which
human conduct is, or of those by which it should be, influenced.82
Mill continued that Bentham’s ‘general conception of human nature and life,
furnished him with an unusually slender stock of premises’. He was particularly struck
by the apparent absence of any concept of ‘conscience’.
Nothing is more curious than the absence of recognition in any of
[Bentham’s] writings of the existence of conscience, as a thing distinct
from philanthropy, from affection for God or man, and from self-interest
in this world or in the next.
Mill writes that Bentham’s
80 Evans, Fabrication of Virtue, p. 438, n. 4.
81 Semple, Bentham’s Prison, p. 322.
82 Hazlitt, Spirit of the Age, p. 23.
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view of human nature and life[...].overlooks the existence of about half
of the whole number of mental feelings which human beings are
capable of, including all those of which the direct objects are states of
their own mind.83
Mill describes the lack of psychological complexity of Bentham’s model of the mind.
In the place in Bentham’s theory where Mill believes Bentham should recognise
‘conscience’, Mill finds a gaping absence, a glaring example, perhaps, of Bentham’s
lack of recognition of internal divisions, inner conflicts within the human mind.
In the twenty-first century, it would be difficult not to be influenced by what
Dinwiddy terms ‘the emphasis on the unconscious and the irrational in modern
psychology’ and to see Bentham’s view of the mind as two-dimensional.84 Mill’s essay
on Bentham makes it clear that his near-contemporary held a similar view. We believe
there is a strong argument that the specific lack of complexity and incompleteness of
Bentham’s psychological theories could be the result of AS. Indeed, the link between
autism and a ‘behaviourist’ view has been shown experimentally. Autistic subjects are
significantly less likely than controls to refer spontaneously to mental functions of
the brain (such as ‘thinking’) when asked what it is for. Most autistic subjects referred
to its role as the cause of behaviour such as ‘walking and running’.85
Extreme behaviourists of the twentieth century such as J.B. Watson (1878-1958)
and B.F. Skinner (1904-1990) did not believe anything useful could be said about
what went on within the human mind: their interest was in stimuli and responses, inputs
and outputs and not in the ‘black box’ between. Bentham did not go so far in denying
the importance of mental states in affecting behaviour. But he did believe that it was at
least theoretically possible to reduce all such states to a single dimension — greater or
lesser degrees of happiness; more or less punishment, more or less reward; quantities
of aversive and quantities of positive stimuli.
In An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation and A Table of
the Springs of Action, Bentham set out his scheme of human motivation in meticulous
detail, analysing into many categories the positive and negative emotions. However,
83 Ryan, Utilitarianism, pp. 150, 152, 155.
84 Dinwiddy, Bentham, p. 122.
85 S. Baron-Cohen, ‘Are autistic children “behaviourists”? An example of their mental-physical and
appearance-reality distinctions’, Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorder, xix (1989), pp.
579-600.
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the ‘essential purpose of Bentham’s attempt to produce an exhaustive analysis of pains
and pleasures, motives and sanctions, was to lay out before the legislator the factors
that determined the conduct of human beings, and the possible means of influencing
it. What needed to be contrived was that people should pursue their own happiness in
ways that were either innocuous, or actually conducive, to the happiness of others; and
the basic means available to the legislator for achieving this were punishments and
rewards’.86
His psychology was elaborated for the purpose of allowing the legislator to
influence individual behaviour in order to maximise happiness (utility) of society as a
whole. Bentham’s behaviourist descendants would have a similar approach to the
individual. Indeed, in the Panopticon, ‘a new mode of obtaining power of mind over
mind, in a quantity hitherto without example’, Bentham sought to change behaviour in
a manner that was to become the hallmark of the behaviourists. 87 Watson, for
example, wrote as follows:
Give me a dozen healthy infants and my own specified world to bring
them up in, and I’ll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to
become any kind of specialist I might select — doctor, lawyer, merchant
chief, and yes, even beggarman and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants,
tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors.88
In experiments, people with AS can recognise happiness and sadness but have
more trouble with more subtle emotions such as surprise, embarrassment and jubilation
which require the understanding of the mental states of those experiencing the
emotions.89 This might suggest the existence of basic positive and negative emotional
states, accessible without deep awareness of self or other. One could speculate that
reducing all motivation to pleasure and pain would appear to make sense if other
emotional states felt less ‘real’. It is thus possible that Bentham’s restricted, one-
dimensional view of human motivation emerged from a basic constriction in his
understanding of the nature of emotion linked to AS.
86 Dinwiddy, Bentham, p. 30.
87 Bowring, iv. p. 39.
88 J.B.Watson, cited in I. McEwan, ‘The Great Odyssey’, The Guardian, Saturday Review (9 June 2001),
pp. 1-3.
89 See S. Baron-Cohen, A. Spitz & P. Cross, ‘Do children with autism recognise surprise — a research note’,
Cognition and Emotion, vii (1993), pp. 507-16.
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Three psychological models of AS: lack of ‘theory of mind’, ‘weak central
coherence’ and ‘impaired executive function’
There are currently three main broad based psychological models of the autistic
spectrum disorders which are not mutually exclusive and together try to account for
the different aspects of autistic disorder: 1. the AS sufferer lacks ‘theory of mind’:
there is a lack of intuitive and automatic attribution of mental states to others, the
ability to do what cognitive scientists and psychotherapists have come to call
`mentalizing’; 2. the AS sufferer employs a cognitive style of ‘weak central coherence’
focusing on detail (this theory addresses the strengths of the autistic mind); and 3. the
AS sufferer has impaired ‘executive’ function: top-down organization of non-routine
behaviour is impaired. This may account for the perseverative aspect of the
psychopathology.90 It is our contention that there is evidence supporting all three
in Bentham’s case in addition to evidence for the classic triad of impairments of
autism.
Theory of mind’
Bentham’s apparently deficient ‘theory of mind’ and his resulting inability to
‘mentalize’ have been discussed in the preceding sections. It is important to
emphasise that it is the intuitive, near-effortless capacity to appreciate what is going
on in another’s mind that is lacking in autistic conditions. AS sufferers, with normal
or high cognitive abilities, can sometimes acquire such abilities to an extremely high
degree of proficiency but the acquisition requires hard work, rather in the way a second
language is acquired with so much more effort than the mother tongue.91
A large number of different experimental tests have been used to determine ‘theory
of mind’ functioning. Many rely on ‘false-belief’ tests: whether the (autistic) subject can
understand that different people can have different beliefs about the same situation.
So-called ‘first-order’ tests involve inferring one person’s mental state. ‘Second-
order’ tests involve considering embedded mental states (i.e. one person’s mental
state about the mental states of others).
Baron-Cohen points out that ‘there are no reported cases of autism spectrum
90 See Frith, Autism, Chapter 10.
91 See Nazeer, Send in the Idiots for an account of an autistic individual very successfully acquiring theory
of mind.
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disorder who pass first-order theory of mind tests at the right mental age’ while
acknowledging that a proportion of such cases do pass such tests at a later stage:
Whereas first-order tests correspond to a four year old mental age level,
second order tests correspond to a six year old mental age level [...] some
individuals with autism or Asperger’s Syndrome who are high functioning
(in terms of 10 and language level) and who are usually adults, may even
pass second order false-belief tests Those who can pass such second
order tests may have difficulties in more advanced theory of mind tests,
such as inferring complex mental states such as bluff and double bluff in
story characters — an eight year old mental age level test.92
In summary, the fact that Bentham shows himself on many occasions capable of
making accurate assessments of the contents of other people’s minds does not rule
out the contention that this did not come easily or ‘naturally’ to him, that he had to
work to establish this ability which, as the examples above show, remained
inconsistently established in his adult life.
‘Weak central coherence’ and ‘impaired executive function’
Other psychological aspects of autism have been less emphasised. As just
mentioned, particular neurocognitive styles have been discovered to be associated
with autism. We hypothesize that ‘weak central coherence’ may help explain
Bentham’s enthusiasm for detail and that ‘impaired executive function’ may be
manifest in his lack of organizing capacity and the almost perseverative quality of his
working style.93
Harrison’s description indicates weak central coherence and relatively impaired
executive function in Bentham’s working style: ‘publishing parts or fragments, starting
things without completing them, was something which persisted[...].Bentham was
temperamentally more inclined to take on new projects than finish old ones, and in any
case his main overall project kept sprouting new limbs which he felt had to be
92 See Baron-Cohen, Theory of Mind, pp. 14, 15.
93 F. Happé ‘Parts and wholes, meaning and minds: central coherence and its relation to theory of
mind’, in Understanding Other Minds, ed. S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg & D. Cohen, (2nd edn.),
Oxford, 2000.
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properly developed before publication’.94
Similarly Lieberman says:
yet the most basic question about his biography is how a man who at the
age of 21 “fearfully and tremblingly” recognized a lifetime’s vocation in
legislative science and then proceeded to devote the next sixty years to
“writing at the rate of ten to twenty pages a day”, still contrived to leave
each of the main branches of his legislative system unfinished and
unrealized when death finally came in his 84th year in 1832.95
Dumont provided the executive organizational control that Bentham lacked:
Dumont, in the Traitds de legislation which he produced on the basis of
Bentham’s unpublished writings in 1802, was remarkably effective in
presenting his ideas in a coherent, comprehensible, and readable form, and
the work was quickly recognized as one of major importance.96
Empathising-Systemising theory
Baron-Cohen has proposed a two-dimensional psychological model of normal socio-
cognitive function. One dimension, empathising - the drive to identify emotions and
thoughts in others and to respond to them appropriately - includes not only inference
about the thoughts and feelings of others but also appropriate spontaneous emotional
reactions, enabling an understanding of the behaviour of others and natural ways of
responding. The other dimension, systemising, is defined as the drive to analyse and
build systems in order to understand and predict non-agentive events. The identification
of the relationships between components and the correlations between events enables
the understanding of relevant underlying ‘rules’. In people with extreme
‘systemising’ bias, these capacities are much greater than ‘empathising’ skills.97
One research study found that males with AS performed poorly on
empathising tasks compared with non-AS males, who in turn performed poorly
94 R. Harrison, Jeremy Bentham: A Fragment on Government, Cambridge, 1988, p. xiii.
95 Lieberman, ‘Bentham to Benthamism’, p. 201.
96 Dinwiddy, Bentham, p. 10.
97 S. Baron-Cohen, ‘Is Asperger Syndrome Necessarily Viewed as a Disability?’ Focus on Autism and
Other Developmental Disabilities, xvii (2002), pp. 186-91.
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compared to non-AS females.98 Although Lawson et al believe their results do not
support the weak central coherence model, Frith argues that the weak central
coherence model is compatible with the two dimensional model of AS because,
although at first sight concern with structure would seem inimical to weak central
coherence, in fact ‘systemisers’, including those with AS, collect information in ‘self-
limiting taxonomies that do not link up with each other’. Jeremy Bentham can be seen to
exemplify this approach.
The autistic mind seems to be suited to working algorithmically within a closed
system of specified rules’.99 This seems admirably to describe Bentham’s method of
‘bifurcation’ or `bipartite analysis’ to which he attached great value. As Dinwiddy
states, ‘It was certainly novel as applied to the field of legislation, and one can see why,
as a believer in codification, Bentham found it so attractive. He thought that by means
of it he could produce a systematic and exhaustive catalogue of offences or crimes,
which would in turn provide the basis for an ordered and comprehensive code of penal
law’.100
Bentham as the arch ‘systemiser’ is here on display. It is of note that this theory
of the ‘empathising’/ ‘systemising’ divide in cognitive processing has close parallels
with the contrast Mill stresses between Coleridge and Bentham.101
Jeremy Bentham and John Howard
Lucas brought together the available evidence and concluded, despite the limitations
of retrospective diagnosis, that John Howard suffered from Asperger’s Syndrome.102
Frith included a section on Howard in the most recent edition of her book on autism.103
As Semple writes:
Despite his saintly qualities, Howard left an ambiguous legacy; there is
no adequate modern biography, so the contradictions in his personality
98 J. Lawson, S. Baron-Cohen, & S. Wheelwright, ‘Empathising and Systemising in Adults with and
without Asperger Syndrome’, Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, xxxiv (2004), pp. 301-
10.
99 Snyder, ‘Autistic Genius’, p. 471.
100 Dinwiddy, Bentham, p. 48.
101 See Ryan, Utilitarianism. For a modern account of the experience of a high-functioning AS sufferer,
see Grandin, Thinking in Pictures. Many parallels may be drawn between Bentham and Grandin.
102 P. Lucas, ‘John Howard and Asperger’s Syndrome: psychopathology and philanthropy’, History of
Psychiatry, xii (2001), pp. 73-101. (A version of this paper is available at www.palucas.co.uk).
103 Frith, Autism, pp. 55-7.
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and his achievements have yet to be explored [...] His obituary in the
Gentleman’s Magazine condescendingly deplored the “not unexpected,
yet certainly untimely, death of the eccentric, but truly worthy, John
Howard”.
She cites a draft preface written by Bentham which ‘shows how close he believed
their affinity to be’: The obligations I owe to you [Howard] are great and many[...].
From your example I have derived encouragement in many a fit of despondency, and
argument in many a debate.104
Probably mindful of charges levelled at both him and Howard, Bentham wrote
of Howard:
He is no crack-brained enthusiast: the qualities of his head are scarcely
inferior to those of his heart [...] From all this rhapsody you would be
apt to infer that I fancied myself a great man. The fact is, I live in the
same dirty chambers, and am as poor as when you knew me [...] Mr
Howard and the public honour he has met with, are of more use to me
than you would imagine to prove to my friends that I am not crazy.105
It seems significant that Semple perceived a degree of identification by Bentham
with Howard. There were similarities between Howard and Bentham in some of the
content of their prison projects, in their persistence in the face of an unresponsive
public, and in the reputations each attracted as ‘eccentric’. Underlying Bentham’s
sympathy and respect for Howard may have been a sense that Howard and he shared
something fundamental: perhaps their mutual AS.
Lucas noted a lack of a ‘psychologically coherent human portrait’ of John
Howard and Semple the lack of an ‘adequate modern biography’.106 Burns made a
similar point with regard to Bentham.107 The fact that both books remain unwritten
may have the same cause and connect with a fundamentally ‘absent self’ at the heart of
104 Semple, Bentham’s Prison, pp. 77, 74.
105 Correspondence (CW), ii. ed. T.L.S. Sprigge, London, 1968, pp. 106-8 (cited in Semple, Bentham’s
Prison, p. 75).
106 Lucas, ‘Howard and Asperger’s’, p. 73, Semple, Bentham’s Prison, p. 77.
107 Burns, ‘Dreams and Destinations’, p. 24.
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the personality in AS and autism.108
AS and the nature of Bentham’s preoccupations
The thrust of the paper up to this point has been to provide the evidence in favour of
the hypothesis that Bentham may have suffered from AS. In the present section we
will explore the links between Bentham’s putative AS and the particular goals he
pursued in his work. It is of course highly speculative. We hypothesise that the
nature of Bentham’s particular experience of life was profoundly influenced by AS
and that this experience played an important part in determining what he sought to do.
Clarification, demystification and the abolition of uncertainty
As Porter put it, ‘irregularity was Jeremy Bentham’s bête noir and the rationalization
of the legal and administrative systems his raison d’étre’.109 It is our suggestion that
Bentham’s hatred of mystification and obscurity in laws and language might be
related to the AS sufferer’s experience of the social world as obscure and mysterious.
His lifelong relentless determination to render transparent and illuminated what was to
him opaque may have arisen from a sense that there were rules to the social interaction
around him, rules that others took for granted but that he had to struggle to render
visible.
As Bentham wrote in 1792, ‘the lies and nonsense that law is stuffed with,
form so thick a mist, that a plain man, nay even a man of sense and learning, who is not
in the trade, can see neither through it or into it’.110
To what has been called Bentham’s ‘cast of mind far more practical than
Hume’s it appeared a matter of belief that reality could be truly apprehended. 111 As
Harrison puts it:
Bentham, in his criticism, is supposing that there is, in principle, a way in
which things can be made ideally clear and so described really as they are
without any trace of fiction.112
108 See Frith, Autism, p. 208.
109 R. Porter, Enlightenment: Britain and the creation of the Modern World, London, 2000, p. 213.
110 Cited in Harrison, Bentham, p. 13.
111 J. Bender, Imagining the Penitentiary: Fiction and the Architecture of Mind in Eighteenth Century
England, Chicago & London, 1987, p. 37.
112 Harrison, Bentham, p. 25.
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Such ‘concrete’ thinking is seen in Bentham’s beliefs about the ‘reality’ of
pleasure and pain.
For Hume, and later for Bentham, reality as ordinarily conceived was
just a special form of fiction [...] Bentham, inspired by Hume but
stopping short of his radical skepticism, instead accepted as irreducibly
“real” the mechanisms of pleasure and pain founded in sensory experience
and material circumstance.113
The other prime motivation for Bentham was what Bahmueller called ‘the
banishment of chance and the consolidation of certainty’.114 He struggled throughout
his life and work to impose order on chaos, and to increase security in the face of
unpredictability and disorder. It does not seem far-fetched to ascribe such profoundly
influential urges within Bentham to his AS: to suggest that the world experienced as
unpredictable and chaotic by a young AS sufferer might leave such a deep and
lasting antipathy to disorder and uncertainty as to generate long lasting desire to
improve matters.
Context
In a discussion of the difficulty which people with autism or AS have in social
interaction, Frith stresses the problem such individuals have in understanding the
meaning of implicit communication — for example, incomplete phrases, gestures or
facial expressions. Context is everything, and such people are unable to contextualise
and then understand. ‘The meaning of any utterance in word or gesture can only be
properly understood by not treating it piecemeal, but by placing it in context’.115
Frith points out that it is precisely the normally shared assumptions that autistic
people lack:
The set of premises used in interpreting an utterance constitutes what is
generally known as the context. A context is a psychological construct,
113 Bender, Imagining the Penitentiary, pp. 35-6. See the section on Bentham’s psychological theories
above.
114 C.F. Bahmueller, The National Charity Company: Jeremy Bentham’s Silent Revolution, Berkeley, 1981,
p. 56.
115 Frith, Autism, p. 216.
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a subset of the hearer’s assumptions about the world. It is these
assumptions, of course, rather than the actual state of the world, that
affect interpretation of an utterance.116
According to Bender,
Paraphrasis consists in the definition of meaning through its
restatement in alternate sentences employing both the simplest possible
elements and reordered syntax. Bentham is thought to have been the first
to see the sentence rather than the word as the primary integer of linguistic
significance, and he worked to ground fictions in referentiality by
harnessing the expository power of sentences.117
In the light of AS sufferers’ inherent difficulty in contextualising, it may be significant
for our hypothesis that Bentham arrived at the means of contextualising which he
called ‘paraphrasis’ to determine meanings where these appeared to him opaque. As
with his other preoccupying themes discussed above, Bentham seems to have arrived by
conscious intellectual work at illumination that non-autistic people understand
intuitively.
Inspection and the Panopticon
According to Pease-Watkin,
The Panopticon, or Inspection-House — the great circular building
made up of many cells arranged around a central observation tower, from
which one warden could supervise numerous inmates
simultaneously— is in some senses an embodiment, albeit a rather
paradoxical one, of the inventive imagination of Jeremy Bentham. [...] it
is frequently perceived as a concrete manifestation of his philosophy.
The inspection principle working in two ways at once — the warder
keeps the inmates under constant inspection, and the public are free to
116 Ibid., p 216. Citing D. Sperber & D. Wilson, Relevance, Communication and Cognition, (2nd edn.),
Oxford, 1995, pp. 15-16.
117 Sperber and Wilson, Relevance, p. 40.
UCL Bentham Project
Journal of Bentham Studies, vol. 8 (2006)
33
inspect the warder at any time — emphasises the Benthamic hallmarks
of openness and accountability; and the rehabilitatory aspect of the
Panopticon penitentiary draws on and develops Bentham’s favourite
themes of reform and improvement of the human condition. The huge
scale of the project, with a wealth of detail to be considered and
provided for, gave free rein to Bentham’s peculiar genius.118
It is fascinating that in Bentham’s conception of the Panopticon, the three
separate, motivational strands discussed above as linked to AS are combined: ‘order’
is imposed on unruliness, by means of ‘transparency’, which leads to a restructuring
and ‘reform’ of the criminals’ personalities. The mechanism is ‘inspection’.
The importance of ‘inspection’ in this process is an additional possible link to
the hypothesis that Bentham may have suffered AS. As mentioned above, AS is
characterised by impairment in the use of a range non-verbal behaviours, notably eye
to eye gaze.119 As Frith puts it, ‘in autism, the inability to understand other minds is
deeply linked to abnormalities in the use and interpretation of eye gaze’.120 It has in fact
been hypothesised that failure in development of the normally innate gaze reflex is at
the root of AS.121 In one experiment, eye gaze turned out to be a better measure of
mentalizing ability than the standard verbal response. 122 One highly articulate AS
sufferer describes her experience of eye contact: ‘Looking at people’s faces,
particularly into their eyes, is one of the hardest things for me to do. It is almost as bad having
other people looking at me as it is me looking at them’.123
As Semple writes: ‘Bentham’s emblem for his inspection house was an ever-open
eye encircled by the words, “Mercy, Justice, Vigilance”. This image reverberates
chillingly down the centuries’.124 She quotes Bentham writing of enforcing discipline
through continuous inspection:
118 C. Pease-Watkin, ‘Bentham’s Panopticon and Dumont’s Panoptique’, Journal of Bentham Studies, 6,
2003.
119 See World Health Organization, Pocket Guide to the ICD-10 Classification, p. 105.
120 Frith, Autism, p. 105.
121 S. Baron-Cohen, Mindblindness: an Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind, Cambridge MA, 1995.
122 See T. Ruffman, W. Garnham & P. Rideout, ‘Social understanding in autism: Eye gaze as
a measure of core insights’, Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, xlii (2001), pp. 1083-94.
123 See T. Jolliffe et al, ‘Autism: a Personal Account’, Communication: Journal of the National Autistic
Society, xxvi, (1992), pp. 12-19.
124 Semple, Bentham’s Prison, p 143.
UCL Bentham Project
Journal of Bentham Studies, vol. 8 (2006)
34
I will keep an unintermitted watch upon him, I will watch until I observe a
transgression. I will minute it down. I will wait for another: I will note that down
too. I will lie by for a whole day[...]. The next day I produce the list to him. You
thought yourself undiscovered: you abused my indulgence: see how you were
mistaken. Another time, you may have rope for two days, ten days: the longer it
is, the heavier it will fall upon you. Learn from this, all of you, that in this
house transgression never can be safe.125
The sense of Bentham’s highly charged personal involvement is hard to avoid. One
might speculate that its origin is in the childhood internal experience of the young
Bentham, feeling on the receiving end of persistent discomfiting observation.
We hypothesize that the salience of the principle of inspection for Bentham could have
arisen from AS. As suggested above in relation to incomprehensible social rules and
uncertainty, he may have engaged with the domain he found highly problematic with such
intensity and perseverance that it eventually became transformed, for him, into a source of
personal power.
The impressive congruence between transparency, order, reformation and inspection may
go some way to explain Bentham’s reluctance to give up the Panopticon project despite
enormous setbacks. Bentham was only able to explain the ultimate failure of the project by
ascribing hostile intent to George 111. This latter response seems akin to Bentham’s simplistic
mode of explanation noted by Mi11, and is further evidence of a tendency to an un-nuanced,
somewhat paranoid and two-dimensional view of the social world not infrequently
encountered in AS.126
Utilitarianism
Writing of the ‘unmitigated egocentrism’ of those with AS and autism, Frith suggests that
when young ‘they simply did not know that their inner experiences were different from the
inner experiences of other people’. She goes on to contrast ‘normal children [who] get this
fundamental insight early and for free, by virtue of their intuitive mentalizing ability. With a
late-acquired conscious theory of mind, this insight is hard won’.127 It seems there could be a
relationship between Bentham’s egocentricity, his lack of an intuitive understanding of the
125 Ibid., p. 141.
126 See above.
127 Frith, Autism, p. 211.
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profound differences between the inner experiences of individual people, putatively caused by
AS, and his belief in the possibility of the ‘identification of social and individual interest’.
As Bender points out, ‘The identification of social and individual interest is perhaps the
central mystification of utilitarianism’.128 Such identification between the individual and
society might seem more credible to an AS sufferer who cannot but have a restricted
awareness of conflicting motives within himself or herself, within others, and of conflicting
motivations in society as a whole.
Conclusion
Our contention that Jeremy Bentham may have suffered from Asperger’s syndrome is
supported by contemporary accounts of his social oddness, and by the particular nature of his
achievements. We have analysed aspects of his behaviour in each of the three relevant
domains and found it generally consistent with Asperger’s syndrome. We have discussed
Bentham’s egocentricity, his psychological theories, and the congruence between his
preoccupations and the specific difficulties suffered by those with Asperger’s syndrome.
As Sacks puts it, ‘while a single glance may suffice for clinical diagnosis, if we
hope to understand the autistic individual, nothing less than a total biography will
do’.129 Sacks is drawing attention to the reality that each patient [...] has, interwoven
with their autism, an intact, non-autistic part of their personality’.130 But in Bentham’s
case,
It is striking, yet hardly surprising, that no one has even yet written a
thorough biographical account of Bentham’s later years — or indeed of
the second half of his long life. To anyone in sympathy with his ideas
such a task would often be painful; to anyone else much of it would be
inexpressedly tedious.131
Amongst others, Alvarez and Reid have pointed out that the lack of a clear
‘personality’ is somehow at the very heart of the condition of AS. ‘There is
128 Bender, Imagining the Penitentiary, p.306, n. 37.
129 Sacks, Anthropologist on Mars, p. 238.
130 See A. Alvarez & S. Reid, Autism and Personality: Findings from the Tavistock Autism Workshop,
London, 1999, p. 1.
131 Burns, ‘Dreams and Destinations’, p. 24. For a biographical outline see F. Rosen, Bentham, Jeremy
(1748-1832), philosopher, jurist, and reformer Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford,
2004-2006.
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something so striking, so mysterious and disturbing about the condition of autism,
especially the reduction of personhood in the sufferer’.132 The fact that there is still no
‘total biography’ of Bentham may connect with this fundamental diminution in the
quality of his ‘personhood’.
‘The banishment of chance and the consolidation of certainty is what Bentham’s
work is all about’. 133 This assessment resounds strikingly with the typical AS
sufferer’s efforts to find security and to manage uncertainty. Bentham’s lifetime of
indefatigable effort to codify and render clear and unambiguous the vast areas of
jurisprudence, ethics, political theory, welfare and social administration and,
particularly, language, can be seen as having just such motivation. The Panopticon
project in particular could have reflected Bentham’s ‘infantile’ desires for
omniscience and omnipotence as an AS sufferer’s reaction to helpless confusion in
the social world.
Mill wrote in his essay on Bentham that:
The truths which are not Bentham’s, which his philosophy takes no
account of, are many and important [...] [but] almost all rich veins of
original and striking speculation have been opened by systematic half-
thinkers.134
We contend that AS was the underlying explanation for the fact that Bentham
could be viewed as a ‘half-thinker’: AS may have prevented him from having
ordinary access to that part of human experience that Mill found so well-understood
and expressed by Coleridge.
It is striking how well current psychological theories of AS and of ‘autistic
genius’, particularly those that highlight ‘weak central coherence’, appear to fit
Bentham’s mode of working, both in terms of his specific achievements and in terms of
his difficulties in completing and publishing his work. 135 At the same time, the
difficulties in social interaction (illustrated in the present paper) indicate his
impairment in the realm of ‘theory of mind’ — the intuitive understanding of other
people.
132 Alvarez and Reid, Autism and Personality, p. 1.
133 Bahmueller, National Charity Company, p. 56.
134 Quoted in Ryan, Utilitarianism, p. 151.
135 See Snyder, ‘Autistic Genius’; and Happé, ‘Parts and Wholes’.
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We conclude that AS appears to represent the most parsimonious explanation for
Bentham’s particular combination of social oddness and striking intellectual abilities.
AS may prove to be the underlying explanation for the fact that from the start his
ideas have been particularly prone to misunderstanding and caricature. By rendering
him incapable of sharing so many of his contemporaries’ common-sense assumptions,
AS may have enabled Bentham to continue articulating, with extraordinary persistence,
Enlightenment critiques of the status quo in various domains, pushing them to what
he saw as their logical conclusions. AS may help to explain Bentham’s genius insofar
as it led him, partly as a result of particular anxieties and preoccupations, to formulate
questions unanticipated by his contemporaries, at the same time as ‘motivating’ him
to pursue the answers to those question so relentlessly and indefatigably.
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